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A SELECTIVE VIEW OF HISTORY: FEIST
PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL TELEPHONE
SERVICE CO.*
Information is an omnipresent and valuable commodity in
modern society.' In today's information age, the production and
dissemination of information is reaching unprecedented propor-
tions, accounting for a growing percentage of United States wealth
and productivity. 2 As a result, the number of people. dependent
upon the production, trade and use of information is also increas-
ing.3 An expansion of information-based products and services has
come concomitant with the information explosion. 4 Factual compi-
lations—the arrangement and coordination of factual data into use-
ful, practical, service-oriented information packages—compose a
subset of this growing information industry. 5 Consequently, issues
concerning the availability of legal protection for such compilations
frequently arise. 6
* The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Professor Alfred C. Yen in de-
veloping this Note topic.
' Michael Klipper & Meredith Senter, Jr., Supreme Court Rules Thick Books Thinly Protected,
CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1991, at 19.
2 U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 158 (1987) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. Research
conducted by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the President's Com-
mission on Industrial Competitiveness has identified the information industry as a "crucial
element in the U.S. economy and its overall international competitiveness." OTA REPORT,
supra, at 225. According to the commission's report, information and information-based
products serve as a vital source of revenue, employment and economic growth in the United
States. See id. Computer database vendors generated over $6.5 billion in sales each year. U.S.
CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPUTER SOFTWARE & INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY—BACKGROUND PAPER 6 n.12 (1990). In addition, sales of on-line computer services
reached $9 billion in 1990. Philip H. Miller, Note, Life After Feist: Facts, the First Amendment,
and the Copyright Status of Automated Databases, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 520 (1991) (citing
CHRIS ELWELL, ONLINE SERVICES: 1990 REVIEW, TRENDS & FORECAST 20 (1991)).
3 OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 158.
Id. Examples of various information-based products and fact-finding services abound,
ranging from simple directories and mailing lists, to automated book-locator systems and
geographic information systems. See Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the
Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343,
1369 nn.121-22 (1991). Of particular significance is the proliferation of on-line services and
computerized databases serving as information sources. See Miller, supra note 2, at 517-18.
s See Klipper & Senter, supra note 1, at 19. Some common examples of compilations
include: telephone directories, judicial decision reporters, restaurant guides, real-estate list-
ings, bibliographies, membership lists, credit-rating databases and stock price quotations. Id.
6 Miller, supra note 2, at 509, 517, 521; see also William Patry, Copyright in Compilations of
Facts (or Why the "White Pages" Are Not Copyrightable), Comm. & L., Dec. 1990, at 37, 39.
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According to commentators, the copyrightability of factual
compilations has long been legally problematic.' For nearly one
hundred years of United States copyright history, a division existed
in the federal circuits concerning the copyrightability of factual
compilations. 8
 One position, taken by the Seventh, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, protected a compiled work based on the industry
or labor invested in the work. 9
 Termed the "sweat theory" or the
See, e.g., Beryl R. Jones, Factual Compilations and the Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. Rev.
679, 688 (1986) (courts and commentators unable to develop a uniform theory or method-
ology for protecting factual compilations); Yen, supra note 4, at 1343 (application of copyright
protection to factual compilations is confused area of copyright law). Numerous articles have
been written about the problems concerning the copyrightability of factual compilations. See,
e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction
Literary Works, 81 CoLum. L. Rev. 516 (1981); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial
Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 CoLum. L. REV. 1865 (1990); Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1569 (1963); Jones, supra; William Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Reply, Comm. & L.,
Oct. 1984, at 11; Brian A. Dahl, Note, Originality and Creativity in Reporter Pagination: A
Contradiction in Terms?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 713 (1989); Michael J. Haungs, Note, Copyright of
Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment, 23 Cows'. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 347
(1990).
In addition, the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.—about which this Note is written—has sparked the publication of
several recent articles about the copyrightability of factual compilations. See, e.g., Jane C.
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural
Telephone, 92 Couvt. L. REV. 338 (1992); Miller, supra note 2; Patry, supra note 6; Shira
Perlmutter, The Scope of Copyright in Telephone Directories: Keeping Listing Information in the
Public Domain, 381 COPYRIGHT SOCY 1 (1990); Yen, supra note 4.
9
 Patry, supra note 6, at 39; Haungs, supra note 7, at 348. Several cases have held that
an author's investment of skill and labor is enough to warrant copyright protection in a
factual compilation. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F2d 1081, 1086 (7th
Cir. 1990); West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1228 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d
128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir.
1977); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 633 F. Supp.
214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987), aff 'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., I I 1 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
In contrast, other cases have held that an author's investment of labor is insufficient to
warrant copyright protection in a factual compilation and only those works demonstrating
creativity in the selection and arrangement of facts deserve protection. See, e.g., Harper
House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989); Worth v. Selchow &
Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Financial
Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 820 (1987); Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publish-
ers, 756 F.2d 801, 813 (11th Cir. 1985); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d
Cir. 1984); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981).
9
 See, e.g., Illinois Bell, 905 F.2d at 1086 (directory compiled by telephone company from
internally maintained records independently created is adequately original and second com-
piler may not use facts in compilation unless facts are obtained independently by second
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"sweat of the brow" approach by commentators, 1° this theory pro-
tects any fact-based work resulting from the exertion of meaningful
industry or significant labor expended in the process of garnering
the facts composing the work." In contrast, the Second, Fifth, Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits extend protection to factual compilations by
virtue of a work's creativity. 12 Termed the "creative selection" ap-
proach by one commentator," this theory of copyright awards pro-
tection only to those works exhibiting a modicum of creativity in
the selection and arrangement of the facts composing the work."
On March 27, 1991, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the United States Supreme Court confronted and re-
solved the long-standing split among the circuits concerning the
copyrightability of factual compilations by holding that' the white
pages of a telephone directory are not copyrightable. 15 In Feist, the
plaintiff filed suit in federal district court in Kansas, alleging copy-
right infringement of its local telephone directory's white pages."
compiler); Hutchinson, 770 F.2d at 131-32 (where telephone company's comprehensive al-
phabetical telephone directory is assembled from data internally maintained, directory is
independently created and sufficiently original); Rural, 663 F. Supp. at 218, aff'd, 916 F.2d
718 (10th Cir. 1990) rev'd sub nom. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct.
1282 (1991) (white pages of telephone directory constitute original authorship and therefore
are copyrightable).
10 See, e.g., Patry, supra note 6, at 42; Yen, supra note 4, at 1344. This approach is also
called the "industrious collection" standard. See Haungs, supra note 7, at 348.
11 See Schroeder, 566 F.2d at 5 ("industrious collection" enough to sustain copyright
protection in gardening services directory). Consequently, under this theory other compilers
must start from scratch and may not copy from the competing work. See United Tel. Co. of
Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co., 671 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd, 855
F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (competing compiler cannot benefit from plaintiff's copyrighted
work).
See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989)
(unique selection, format and combination of forms and information sufficient to warrant
protection of daily organizer format); Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc.,
808 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (rudimentary procedure
for collecting and filling in information on bond cards insufficient creative selection and
arrangement to warrant copyright protection); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated
Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 813 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (copying of facts and underlying
selection of telephone directory that was sufficiently arranged to meet originality threshold
constitutes infringement); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th
Cir. 1981) (labor of research by an author not copyrightable).
" See Yen, supra note 4, at 1344. This approach is also called the "originality standard."
See Haungs, supra note 7, at 348.
14 See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984). Under this theory,
courts afforded no protection to a work compiled strictly of facts, despite the likelihood or
showing that substantial effort accompanied the collection of facts composing the work. See
Moody's Investors, 808 F.2d at 207-08.
" 111 S. Ct, 1282, 1297 (1991).
16 /d. at 1287.
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The unanimous Supreme Court rejected the sweat theory of copy-
right protection and used the creative selection and arrangement
approach to refuse copyright protection to the white pages listings.' 7
Feist is therefore the Supreme Court's first pronouncement on the
status of factual compilations under federal copyright law.' 8
In Feist, the Supreme Court's decision to deny copyright pro-
tection to the telephone directory involved the Court's interpreta-
tion of the "originality" standard in copyright law.' 9 According to
the Court, this standard requires that a work granted copyright
protection be independently created by the author and reach some
minimal level of creativity. 20 The Feist Court's opinion, written by
Justice O'Connor, states that originality, as a prerequisite to copy-
right protection, is mandated by the Copyright Clause of the United
States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. 21
This Note examines the "originality" standard of copyright
protection in the context of Feist and explores the basis for and
implications of the Court's assertion that originality is constitution-
ally mandated. 22 Section I traces the historical development of the
originality requirement in copyright law. 23 Section II reviews the
basis for the Feist holding and discusses the Court's emphasis on
the originality standard.24 Section III analyzes the validity of the
Court's insistence that originality is constitutionally mandated. 25
This section also discusses the possible impact that the Court's con-
stitutional grounding of originality may have on the future gener-
ation and protection of factual compilations. 26
" Id. at 1290-96. For a means/end analysis of the Feist Court's application of the creative
selection and arrangement approach, see Yen, supra note 4.
1 " See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., I 1 1 S. Ct. 1282,1287 (1991); Patry,
supra note 6, at 40. As Patty notes, the Court has on two occasions mentioned compilations
in dictum. Patry, supra note 6, at 40-41. In both instances the Court did not rule out the
possibility that directories could be protected. See Harper & Row, Publications, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539,547 (1985); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
250 (1903).
12 See 111 S. Ct. at 1287-88.
2° M. at 1287.
" Id. at 1288. "Originality is a constitutional requirement." Id. at 1288. "As a constitu-
tional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more
than a de ntinimis quantum of creativity." Id. at 1297.
22 See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the originality
requirement in the context of Feist.
" See infra notes 27-116 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 117-54 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.




1. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ORIGINALITY IN COPYRIGHT
LAW
One of the more elusive requirements of copyright protection,
particularly when applied to factual compilations, is that a work be
original." The originality requirement is contained in section 102(a)
of the 1976 Copyright Act, which provides that copyright protection
extends only to "original works of authorship."28 The originality
requirement in the statute expressly extends to compilations. 29 This
explicit statutory mandate of originality is unique to the 1976 Act. 3°
Although none of the earlier copyright acts contained an express
statutory mandate of originality, historically, originality in some
form has been a prerequisite of copyright protection. 31
A. The Independent Creation Concept of Originality
For the first century of United States. copyright history, begin-
ning with the first Copyright Act of 1790, 32 originality was synon-
ymous with independent creation." Courts generally awarded pro-
tection to works resulting from the independent labor and skill of
the author." Under the independent creation interpretation, any-
thing short of actual copying met the originality standard, regard-
less of how formulaic the work may have been." The United States
Supreme Court rationalized this independent creation interpreta-
27 Dahl, supra note 7, at 713 (originality requirement "perhaps the most unclear require-
ment" in copyright law); Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 29, 31 (1983)
(judicially developed doctrine relating to the originality requirement "uncertain and con-
fused").
23 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (1988).
29 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). By definition, a compilation "as a whole" must constitute "an
original work of authorship." Id. § 101.
'° Dahl, supra note 7, at 716 & n.29. The English Statute of Anne protected "any Book
or Books." 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710). The 1790 Act protected any "map, chart, book or books."
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1909). The 1909 Act failed to mention
originality and limited copyright protection to "all writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. 4
(1947) (originally enacted as Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075-88) (repealed
1978). The drafters of the 1976 Act deliberately left the phrase "original works of authorship"
undefined and intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established
by the courts under the 1909 statute. H.R. REr. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976);
S. Rap. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975).
" Olson, supra note 27, at 31, 35 (originality long and consistently required for copyright
protection).
32 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1909).
33 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1874; Olson, supra note 27, at 35-37.
94
 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1874; Olson, supra note 27, at 35-37.
" Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1874; Olson, supra note 27, at 37.
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tion by inferring "originality" from the word "authors" in the Copy-
right Clause of the United States Constitution. 36 As interpreted by
the Court, an "author" signified an originator, or one to whom a
work owed its origin. 37 Originality in a work, therefore, merely
required that the work originate as a product of labor expended by
the person claiming authorship. 38
Thus, early case law in the United States, as decided under the
1790 Act, stressed the necessity that a protected work be indepen-
dently created, originating from the author's investment of labor."
This rewarding of independent creation in United States copyright
cases mirrored English copyright decisions. 4° The similarities be-
tween American and English copyright decisions, authors note, re-
sulted from the fact that early American copyright concepts were
outgrowths of the English system of copyright. 41 The English system
of copyright was embodied in the Statute of Anne, titled "An Act
for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of
printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies during
the Times therein mentioned." 42
 The Statute of Anne was designed,
as its title suggests, to advance knowledge and learning. 43 Similarly,
56 Dahl, supra note 7, at 716. The Copyright Clause—Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution--empowers Congress "[r]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
"See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. 111  U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (author in
constitutional sense is originator).
" See id.
39 See, e.g., Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1037-38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728)
(second compiler of Latin Grammar book may not borrow public domain text from first
compiler and must use own skill and labor to independently create second compilation). See
also Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1873-74 (suggesting that the judicial focus on labor invested
in the work, as opposed to the inspiration, until the mid-nineteenth century was largely a
function of the predominance of highly useful informational works (i.e., maps, arithmetic
and grammar primers, calendars and law books) during the period). Cf. Clayton v. Stone, 5
F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872) (copyright protection of newspaper denied
because copyright not intended for encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with
learning and the sciences).
4° See, e.g., Matthewson v. Stockdale, 33 Eng. Rep. 103, 105-06 (Ch. 1806) (upholding
copyright protection for plaintiff's East India calendar on the basis of the labor invested in
the work).
41 See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 180 (1968) (all
ideas about American copyright originated in the English copyright tradition); Dahl, supra
note 7, at 714 (Copyright Act of 1790 codified English system of copyright).
" 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
" See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1873 (English Statute of Anne characterized copyright
as a device to promote the advancement of knowledge). The preamble of the Statute of
Anne states that the act is designed to fulfill the dual purposes of discouraging piracy and
encouraging "learned Men to compose and write useful Books." 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
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both the Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution and
the Copyright Act of 1790 were designed to promote the advance-
ment of knowledge. 44 Consequently, a large number of early Amer-
ican and English copyright cases involved the protection of infor-
mational works. 45
Two prominent cases, Gray v. Russell and Emerson v. Davies,
illustrate early United States courts' willingness to award protection
to independently created informational works." In the 1839 case
of Gray v. Russell, the Circuit Court of the District of Massachusetts
held that original annotations accompanying public domain text
were copyrightable subject matter.47 In Gray, the plaintiff, Benjamin
Gould, had prepared notes in an edition of Adam's Latin Grammar. 48
Gould alleged that a second publisher of a competing edition of
Adam's Latin Grammar infringed upon Gould's copyright by copying
the annotations into the competing edition of Latin text. 49 The
second publisher defended on the basis that Gould held an invalid
copyright in his annotations because the notes were merely collected
from various other editions of the book." The defendant argued
that such a collection of public domain materials was insufficiently
original to warrant copyright protection.'' In an opinion by Justice
Story, the Gray court held that the annotations were entitled to
copyright protection. 52
In upholding the validity of Gould's copyright, the Gray court
established the independent labor standard of originality. 53 Under
this standard, the Gray court awarded protection to Gould's work
44 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1873 (underlying legislative policy of United States
Constitution and 1790 Act was promotion of knowledge); PATTERSON, supra note 41, at 193
(prominent idea in the minds of Constitutional Framers seems to have been learning); EATON
S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 198-99 (1879) (goal of the law of copyright is the promotion
of learning and useful knowledge).
45 Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1873 & n.28 (citing AUGUSTINE B/RRELL, SEVEN LECTURES
ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 170-71 (1899)). For a comprehensive
listing of early English and American cases protecting directories and other informational
works, see DRONE, supra note 44, at 153 & nn.1-17.
49 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1037-38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (original annotations accom-
panying public domain text copyrightable subject matter); 8 F. Cas. 615, 620-21 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (mathematics book copyrightable).
47 10 F. Cas. at 1037-38.




52 Id. at 1037-38.
55 Id. at 1038. See also Olson, supra note 27, at 36-37.
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by virtue of the independent skill and labor invested by the author. 54
The court rejected the defendant's contention that because public
domain materials are available to everyone, compilations of such
information are necessarily unprotectable. 55
 The Gray court stated,
to the contrary, that if such materials have been accumulated and
combined by the labor of one compiler, a second compiler may not
borrow the information and thereby profit from the industry, tal-
ents or skill of the first compiler. 56
Similarly, in the 1845 case of Emerson v. Davies, the Circuit Court
of the District of Massachusetts held that a second compiler of a
mathematics book must independently recreate the compilation of
materials in order to avoid infringement of the first compiler's
copyright.57 As in Gray, the Emerson court stated that a work merits
protection by virtue of the author's labor and skill. 58 Substantial
copying that resulted in piracy of copyrighted subject matter was
thus prohibited, according to the Emerson court."
Gray and Emerson therefore established a standard of originality
requiring merely that a protected work be independently created."
In awarding copyright protection, the two cases focused on the skill
or labor invested by the author in the works. 6 ' Under this standard
of originality, courts of this period frequently recognized copyright
protection in directories and other types of compilations. 62
In addition to the case law supporting the independent creation
concept of originality, secondary sources from the period also
54
 10 F. Cas. at 1038.
55 See id. at 1037-38.
56 Id. at 1038.
57
 8 F. Cas. 615, 620-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
"See id. at 619-20. The court quoted language from Cray, noting, by analogy, that a
second map maker does not infringe upon a first map maker's copyright if the second map
maker independently makes a map of the same territory using his own skill, labor or expense.
Id. at 619.
59 /d. at 619.
09 Olson, supra note 27, at 36.
61 Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1037-38; Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619.
52 See, e.g., Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (upheld copyright
in a chart for cutting women's dress patterns and boy's coat and jacket patterns); Lawrence
v. Guppies, 15 F. Cas. 25, 25 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (upheld copyright in monthly chart
containing, in tabular form, the alphabetical listing of the names and addresses of debtors
and creditors). In addition, deposit records of works registered for federal copyright pro-
tection under the 1790 Copyright Act reveals a predominance of information and instruc-
tional works. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1873 n.28 (citing FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS
1790-1800 xxii ( J. Gilreath ed., 1987)). See also DRONE, supra note 44, at 153 & nn.l-17 for
a comprehensive listing of the cases protecting directories and other informational works.
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equated originality with labor or skill. 63 As one contemporary com-
mentator, George Ticknor Curtis, stated in his 1847 treatise, origi-
nality is:
[s]omething [the author] must show to have been pro-
duced by himself; whether it be purely original thought
or principle ... or a collection, the result of his industry
and skill. . . . He must show something which the law can
fix upon as the product of his and not another's labors."
Another well-known commentator, Eaton S. Drone, similarly stated
in his 1879 treatise that "the true test of originality is whether the
production is the result of independent labor or of copying." 65 Accord-
ing to Drone, nearly all products resulting from independent lit-
erary labor were worthy of protection if the author demonstrated
something material and valuable that was not copied from another
but was something he produced by himself. 66 Under Drone's stan-
dard, multiple productions of the same kind could be protected if
the individuals producing the works invested labor in that for which
they claimed protection.°
During this period, Drone expressly considered protecting di-
rectories and other informational works similar to the white pages
denied protection in Fei,st. 68
 In his treatise on copyright, Drone used
directories several times to illustrate his points about originality and
as examples of copyrightable subject matter. 69
 In one instance Drone
stated: "The compilation may consist of common facts and infor-
mation which the compiler himself has reduced to writing, as in the
case of a catalogue or a directory. . . ."" Moreover, Drone noted
the constitutional policy of promoting knowledge, stating that the
important inquiry is not to determine whether a production has
literary or scientific merit, but rather whether the work may be
viewed as a "material addition" to the pool of useful knowledge and
information. 7 ' Thus, for the first century of United States copyright
65
 See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 171 (1847);
DRONE, supra note 44, at 208.
H CURTIS, supra note 63, at 169; 171.
H DRONE, supra note 44, at 208 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 199.
67 Id. at 206.
See id. at 153, 206, 207, 209.
65 Id.
70 Id. at 153. Drone also states that courts recognized directories, calendars, catalogues
of names, compilations of statistics, tables of figures and collections of legal forms as copy-
rightable subject matter, despite their lack of literary qualities. Id. at 209.
71 Id. at 210.
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law, courts and commentators viewed originality as meaning inde-
pendent creation. 72
B. Dichotomy of Originality: Independent Creation and Creativity"
In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, courts and commentators
altered their standard of originality and offered a new rationale for
copyright protection.74 These authorities injected the additional no-
tion of creativity into the originality standard.75 As opposed to the
independent labor standard, this new test of a work's originality
required an additional infusion of the author's personality into the
subject matter before the material merited copyright protection. 76
Consequently, originality came to mean that a work not only be
independently produced, but also contain some modicum of cre-
ativity.77 The United States Supreme Court read this creativity com-
ponent of originality into the word "writings" in the Copyright
Clause. 78
The earliest case espousing the dual concept of originality is
the 1879 case of United States v. Steffens—also known as the Trade-
Mark Cases—in which the United States Supreme Court held that
federal trademark statutes grounded in the Copyright Clause were
unconstitutional.79 The issue in the Trade-Mark Cases was whether
" CURTIS, supra note 63, at 171; DRONE, supra note 44, at 208; Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.
Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1037-38
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
" This article hereafter speaks of "originality" as encompassing the dual concepts of
independent creation and creativity. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1867 n.9. Some authorities
divide the two terms, defining "originality" to mean independent creation and "authorship"
to signify some modicum of creativity. See, e.g., Patry, supra note 7, at 19.
74 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1881.
74 See Dahl, supra note 7, at 716.
76 Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1867. Ginsburg terms this approach the "copyright as
personality" approach. Id. at 1882.
Patry, supra note 7, at 18-19.
" See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). See also supra note 36 for the text
of the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.
" 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). A trademark is any word, name, symbol, or device used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his or her goods. 15 U.S.C. 1127 (1988). Trademarks
originated as devices to facilitate the identification of a merchant's product and to prevent
mistake, deception and confusion with respect to the product's origin. ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHT IN A
NUTSHELL § 11.1 (1990). In response to the increasing complexity of state trademark common
law, Congress attempted to federalize trademark legislation in the late nineteenth century.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92. The first trademark laws enacted by Congress were
the Act of July 8, 1870, $11 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, and the Act of Aug. 14, 1876, § 1-8, 19




the congressional trademark acts were within the authority granted
Congress by the United States Constitution. 8° In the Trade-Mark
Cases, the Court reversed three criminal prosecutions for violations
of federal trademark legislation." Although the case focused on
whether federal trademark statutes were properly grounded in the
United States Constitution, the Court's reasoning discussed the
Copyright Clause. 82
In searching for a constitutional basis for the federal trademark
legislation, the Trade-Mark Cases Court examined the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution. 83 In its examination of the Copyright
Clause, the Trade-Mark Cases Court rejected the argument that fed-
eral trademark legislation could be authorized by the words "writ-
ings of authors" in the Copyright Clause." The Court noted that it
rejected the argument because the objects of trademark, unlike
writings, do not require originality. 85 The Court asserted that "writ-
ings," in the context of the Copyright Clause, must be original and
founded in the creative powers of the mind. 86 According to the
Court, writings worthy of copyright protection were "the fruits of
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings,
and the like."87
unconstitutional. Id. According to the Trade-Mark Cases Court, Congress had no power to
regulate purely state matters such as trademark rights. Id. at 96. In response to the Trade-
Mark Cases, Congress passed statutes in 1881 and 1905 solely addressing interstate use of
trademarks. MILLER & DAVIS, supra, § 11.1. In 1946, Congress passed the most current
trademark legislation, the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The Lanham Act
provides for both the federal registration of trademarks and federal court protection against
infringement. Id. §{} 1055, 1114.
8° 100 U.S. at 91-92.
1" Id. at 99. Two indictments were in the southern district of New York, and one was in
the southern district of Ohio. Id. at 91.
ex
	 at 93-94. According to the Court, because the property in trademark is a residual
power of the states, the power of Congress to legislate on the subject must be grounded in
the Constitution. Id. at 93.
L Id. at 93-94. The Court also examined the Commerce Clause—Article 1, Section 8,




at 94. Generally, a trademark is the adoption of a mark already in existence as the
distinctive symbol of a product's manufacturer. Id. At common law, trademark rights arose
from regular usage of the mark and did not depend upon novelty, invention or discovery.
Id. Thus, trademark rights are acquired solely through priority of use. Id.
80 Id. The Court stated: "[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has
been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original,
and are founded in the creative powers of the mind." Id. To the contrary, trademark
protection, according to the Court, did not depend upon any work of the brain, but merely
required that the claimant first appropriate the symbol. Id.
8.1
148	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 34:137
Thus, through the word "writings" as used in the Copyright
Clause, the Trade-Mark Cases Court infused the originality standard
of copyright with a required level of creativity." The Court did not,
however, specify its reasons for asserting that the constitution man-
dates a level of creativity as a prerequisite to copyright protection. 89
The Court read this requirement into the word "writings" in the
Copyright Clause." Moreover, the Court did not explicitly establish
the parameters of copyrightable subject matter under the creativity
standard. 91
 Rather, through its use of the language "and the like"
in describing those works deserving of protection, the Trade-Mark
Cases Court left open the question of which works satisfy the cre-
ativity requirement of copyright. 92
 Nonetheless, subsequent courts
and commentators have interpreted the Trade-Mark Cases as estab-
lishing a constitutional grounding for the creativity aspect of the
originality requirement for copyright protection. 93
 Thus, the Trade-
Mark Cases form the basis for the view that creativity is constitution-
ally mandated. 94
Shortly after the Trade-Mark Cases, the United States Supreme
Court again interpreted the word "writings" in the Copyright
Clause.95 In the 1884 case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
the Court held that photographs are copyrightable within the mean-
ing of the word "writings" in the Copyright Clause." Burrow-Giles
involved the copyrightability of a photograph of Oscar Wilde, taken
by the plaintiff.° In Burrow-Giles, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for copyright infringement of the photograph after the defendant
reproduced the photograph without permission. 98 While admitting
to copying the photograph, the defendant, Sarony, argued that the
plaintiff's photograph was not a "writing" within the meaning of
86
 Id. See also Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) (quoting language from the
Trade-Mark Cases about the scope of "writings" as used in the Copyright Clause to deny
copyright protection to a label).
" See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
90 Id.
91 See id.
92 Id. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for the Trade-Mark Cases Court's use of
the language "and the like."
95 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., I 1 1 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991); Patry,
supra note 7, at 18-19; Dahl, supra note 7, at 716 & n.36.
94 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288; Patry, supra note 7, at 19.
" Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111  U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
96 1d. at 58.
97 Id. at 54. The photograph was titled "Oscar Wilde No. 18." Id.
96 Id. at 54.
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the Copyright Clause. 99 Therefore, Sarony argued, it was unconsti-
tutional for Congress to confer rights of authorship on the person
who took the photograph.'°° The Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected the defendant's argument and held
that the photograph was copyrightable.m The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court's decisioni 02
In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court defined both the words
"authors" and "writings" as used in the Copyright Clause. 1 °3 In
determining the scope of the words "authors" and "writings," the
Burrow-Giles Court focused on the intent of the constitutional fram-
ers.'" The Court examined whether, in constructing the clause, the
framers intended strictly to limit the scope of copyright protection
to literary writings.'°5 The Court determined that the framers in-
tended an expansive interpretation of both the words "authors" and
"writings."")°
In interpreting the word "authors," the Burrow-Giles Court rei-
terated the independent labor concept of authorship, restating the
idea that an author is anyone to whom anything owes its origin."'"
The Court next defined the word "writings" to brOadly encompass
non-literary as well as literary works.'°8 The Court justified its ex-
pansive interpretation of the word "writings" by noting that the
framers of the Constitution explicitly included maps, charts, de-
signs, and other non-literary writings under the scope of protection
in the 1790 Act.'°9 The Burrow-Giles Court inferred from this inclu-
sion of maps and charts that the framers intended a non-literal
interpretation of "writings. "110 In light of this non-literal interpre-
tation, the Court asserted that the Constitution was broad enough
to encompass the copyright of photographs, provided that the pho-
99 Id. at 56. Sarony argued that the plaintiff 's photograph was merely the "reproduction
on paper of the exact features of some natural object or of some person. . . ." Id.
K"' See id. at 56.
101 Id. at 55.
WV Id. at 61.
103 Id. at 57-61.
I04 Id. at 57.
103 a
LOS Id.
10? Id. at 57-58.
108 Id. at 58-60.
, D9 Id. at 56-57.
"0 Id. at 58. The Court stated: "Unless ... photographS can be distinguished in the
classification on this point from the maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts, and
other printings, it is difficult to see why Congress cannot make them the subject of copyright
as well as the others." Id. at 57.
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tographs were "representatives of original intellectual conceptions
of the author."'"
According to the Burrow-Giles Court, the photograph of Oscar
Wilde satisfied this test." 2 For the Court, the plaintiff's selection
and arrangement of the subject, costume, draperies and lighting
merited protection for the photograph." 3 The Court also noted
that the "ordinary production of a photograph" might not be wor-
thy of copyright protection."4 The Court did not, however, extend
its holding to resolve that issue."5 The United States Supreme Court
has recently interpreted the language in Burrow-Giles pertaining to
an author's "original intellectual conceptions" as imposing, along
with the Trade-Mark Cases, a constitutional creativity component
within the originality requirement. 16
II. THE FEIST DECISION
On March 27, 1991, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the United States Supreme Court held that the white
pages of a telephone directory are not copyrightable." 7
 The deci-
sion represents the Court's first effort to inject regularity into the
copyrightability of factual compilations." 8 In Feist, a certified public
telephone utility, Rural Telephone Service Company ("Rural"),
brought a copyright infringement action against a publisher of area-
wide telephone directories, Feist Publications, Inc. ("Feist").' 19 Pur-
suant to a state regulation mandating that all Kansas telephone
companies annually issue updated directories, Rural published a
traditional telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow
in Id. at 58.
112 Id. at 60.
112 Id.
114
 Id. at 59.
I" Id.
" 6 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991).
112 Id. at 1297.
112 Miller, supra note 2, at 507 (Feist Court set out to clear up long-standing confusion
relating to copyrightability of factual compilations); Patry, supra note 6, at 39 (Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari in Feist is vehicle for resolving issues surrounding the copyright-
ability of factual compilations); Yen, supra note 4, at 1343 (Feist is opportunity for Supreme
Court to clarify copyrightability of factual compilations). The issues of copyrightability and
infringement upon the copyrights of telephone directories naturally extend to computer
databases such as mailing and membership lists, genealogies, organization charts, parts cat-
alogs, and many other types of information-based products. Balla H. Celedonia, 'Feist v.
Rural Telephone': Is the Sky Falling for Directory Publishers?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12, 1991, at 28.
Feist, therefore, directly impacts the entire information industry. Miller, supra note 2, at 509.
119
 111  S. Ct. at 1286-87.
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pages. 12° Rural obtained data for the directory from its subscribers,
who, as a condition of telephone service, were required to provide
their names and addresses to Rural.' 2 '
Feist extracted the listings in its area-wide directory from Ru-
ral's single area directory without obtaining Rural's consent. 122 Fur-
ther, Feist incorporated the extractions into its area-wide direc-
tory. 123 The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
granted Rural's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
telephone directories had historically and consistently been af-
forded copyright protection. 124
On appeal by Feist, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment. 125 On appeal from that decision, the
United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed and held for
the defendant, Feist.'" The Feist Court held that Rural's white pages
were not entitled to copyright protection. 127 Consequently, the
Court never reached the issue of infringement.'"
In Feist, the Supreme Court decided which theory of copyright
protection applies to factual compilations.'" As previously dis-
cussed, before Feist the lower federal courts were divided on
whether to protect such compilations.'" While courts using the
"sweat of the brow" standard awarded copyright protection on the
basis of the author's expenditure of labor, other circuits applied the
"creative selection" approach and awarded protection only to those
factual compilations exhibiting creativity in the selection and ar-
rangement of facts."' In Feist, the Court renounced the sweat of
the brow theory and instead applied the creative selection and
IN Id. at 1286.
121 Id.
l22
122 Id. Feist extracted the listings after Rural's refusal to license its listings to Feist. Id.
Omission of the listings within Rural's subscriber area would have resulted in a gap in Feist's
area-wide directory, which serviced 11 different telephone areas in 15 counties. Id. Feist was
successful in securing license agreements with the other 10 telephone companies. Id.
124 Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987).
122 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287.
124. Id. at 1297. While Feist was a unanimous decision, Justice Blackmun concurred only




iso Compare Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990)
with Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1989).
121 See Yen, supra note 4, at 1344-45.
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arrangement approach) 32 Under this approach, the Court denied
copyright protection to the directory.'" The Court held that Rural's
selection and alphabetical listing of its customers' names lacked the
level of originality necessary to copyrightable material.'"
The Feist Court analyzed the issue of the directory's copyright-
ability under the two-pronged originality requirement for copyright
protection.'" The Court stated that originality in copyright requires
that the work be independently created by the author and that it
reach some minimal level of creativity.'" The Court further asserted
that mere facts themselves are not copyrightable, because they are
not independently created by the author, but rather, are merely
discovered.'" The facts of the directory—the names, addresses and
phone numbers of Rural customers—were therefore not protectable
by copyright.'"
According to the Feist Court, to afford copyright protection to
underlying facts—via the "sweat of the brow" approach—would be
to extend protection beyond the creative contributions of the au-
thor.'" Such an extension, according to the Court, fell outside the
statutory and constitutional copyright limits."° The Court nonethe-
less conceded that Rural's directory as a whole could be copyright-
able if the selection and arrangement of the facts reached the nec-
essary level of creativity."' The Court held that Rural's alphabetical
arrangement of names with corresponding addresses and phone
numbers did not rise to the level of creativity necessary to warrant
the listings worthy of copyright protection." 2
' 32 111  S. Ct. at 1291-95.
,33 Id. at 1296.
134 Id. at 1296. The Court stated:
Rural's selection of listings could not be more obvious: it publishes the most
basic information—name, town, and telephone number—about each person
who applies to it for telephone service. This is "selection" of a sort, but it lacks
the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyright-
able expression. Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white pages
directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original.
Id.
135 Id. at 1287.
1" Id.
07 Id, at 1288 (person may not claim originality as to facts "because facts do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship"). •
' 38 Id. at 1286.
'39 1d. at 1291.
14D See id. at 1291-92.
141 Id. at 1289.
' 42 1d. at 1296-97. The Court called Rural's white pages "entirely typical" and "devoid
of even the slightest trace of creativity." Id. at 1296. The Court further stated: "there is
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In the Feist opinion, the Court emphasized that the dichoto-
mous originality standard is not only required by the federal copy-
right statute, but also is constitutionally mandated by the Copyright
Clause."' The Court emphasized that this constitutional require-
ment was "unmistakably clear" and remained the "bedrock princi-
ple" of copyright law.'" The Court first recited the source of Con-
gress's power to enact copyright laws: the Copyright Clause of the
United States Constitution.' 45 The Court then traced the historical
development of the originality standard directly back to the Trade-
Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. 146 The Feist
Court stated that these cases jointly pronounced that the dual
prongs of originality—independent creation and creativity—were
constitutionally mandated.' 47 The Court noted that the Trade-Mark
Cases established the constitutional scope of the word "writings." 148
According to the Feist Court, the Trade-Mark Cases read into the
word "writings" the idea that "originality requires independent cre-
ation plus a modicum of creativity. . . . "149
Similarly, the Feist Court asserted that the Burrow-Giles Court
interpreted the same dual requirement of originality into the word
"authors" in the Copyright Clause.' 5° According to the Feist Court,
Burrow-Giles stressed the creative component of originality.' 51 Con-
sequently, according to the Feist Court, Burrow-Giles established that
the creativity prong of the dual originality standard was a consti-
nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory.
It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to
be expected as a matter of course. . . It is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable."
Id. at 1297.
143 Id. at 1288. Indeed, the Court expressed the holding itself in constitutional terms,
stating that "rtlhe selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural's white pages do not
satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection." Id. at 1296.
'44 Id. at 1288. Moreover, the Court asserted the constitutional requirement of originality
and creativity several times in the opinion. Id. at 1288 ("Originality is a constitutional re-
quirement."), 1290 ("As we have explained, originality is a constitutionally mandated pre-
requisite for copyright protection."), 1296 ("As this Court has explained, the Constitution
mandates some minimal degree of creativity. . . ."), 1297 ("As a constitutional matter, copy-
right protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis
quantum of creativity.").
" 6 Id. at 1288.
16 Id. See supra note 79-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Trade-Mark
Cases and Burrow-Cues.
117 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
148 Id.
149 Id. (emphasis added).
iso Id.
161 Id.
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tutional requirement. 152 Thus, the Feist Court drew its assertion that
the dual-pronged originality standard is dictated by the Constitution
from its reading of the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles.' 53 Section
III of this Note examines the strength of the Court's assertion that
the creativity prong of the current dual-pronged originality stan-
dard is constitutionally mandated. 154
HI. A CONVENIENT OR ACCURATE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY?
In tracing the historical development of the originality standard
of copyright, the Feist Court began with the Trade-Mark Cases.' 55
Consequently, the Court's interpretation of the originality standard
relied on the late nineteenth-century case law.' 55 Arguably, 1879—
the year in which the Trade-Mark Cases were decided—is the correct
starting point for copyright analysis because it is the year in which
the Supreme Court first pronounced the constitutional scope of
copyright protection.' 57 Closer analysis, however, reveals that full
appreciation of what was intended by the language in the. Trade-
Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles requires an examination of earlier case
law. Such an examination exposes weaknesses in the Feist Court's
assertion that creativity is constitutionally mandated.
A. A Selective View of Precedent
First, by beginning its historical review of originality with the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Feist Court overlooked the entire first century
of copyright law in this country.' 58 Additionally, the Court ignored
the English precedent upon which United States copyright law was
based. 159
 From the enactment of the Constitution until the Trade-
Mark Cases, an entire body of case law and secondary sources existed
that construed "originality" merely to require independent crea-
"2 Id.
" Id.
"1 See supra notes 135-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Feist Court's
assertion that the dual-pronged originality standard is constitutionally mandated.
"5 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
"5 See id.
157 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 at 94. See also supra notes 79-94 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Trade-Mark Cases.
"8 See supra notes 32-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first 100 years
of copyright history.






tion.' 6° This collection of authority contemplated protecting—and
actively protected—directories and other informational works on
the basis of the labor invested.' 6 ' For the first one hundred years
of copyright history, in the decades closest to the framing of the
Constitution, originality simply meant independent creation. Thus,
by ignoring earlier precedent and selectively beginning its historical
review of copyright law in 1879, the Feist Court misleads the reader
into thinking that it is reciting an "unmistakably clear" and well-
established constitutional mandate.I 62 In reality, considering the
complete copyright history, the Feist Court's assertion of a consti-
tutional mandate is not legally well founded.
Moreover, pre-1879 history strongly suggests that the consti-
tutional framers contemplated protecting directories and other in-
formational works. 165 The bulk of the case law for the first one
hundred years of copyright law in the United States—arguably
based on the framers' intent—protected directories.'" Presumably,
the Trade-Mark Cases Court and Burrow-Giles Court intended to
interpret those cases consistent with the intent of the framers who
drafted the Copyright Clause.
And yet, the Feist Court neither refers to the pre-1879 history
nor offers any explanation of why the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the framers' intent and the constitutional standard
changed in 1879. If the Trade-Mark Cases Court or Burrow-Giles
Court had offered an explanation for the new standard, the Feist
Court's exclusive reliance on the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles
would be more justified. The absence of any explanation, however,
only deepens the confusion today. Because subsequent cases contin-
ued to build upon the empty pronouncements in the Trade-Mark
Cases and Burrow-Giles, copyright law developed into an inconsistent
and confusing doctrine. By relying on this lineage as a basis for its
decision, the Feist Court resuscitated and perpetuated the confusion.
The Feist decision is confusing not only for its disappointing
lack of explanation. It is also unclear whether the Trade-Mark Cases
I"" See supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the independent
creation standard of originality.
' 6 ' See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case law pro-
tecting factual compilations on the basis of the labor expended in compiling the works.
162 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 1 1 I S. Ct. 1282,1288 (1991).
162 See supra notes 32-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of pre-1879 copyright
history.
164 See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case law pre-
dominating the first 100 years of copyright law.
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and Burrow-Giles case actually support the Feist Court's assertion of
a constitutionally mandated creativity requirement. Indeed, the
Trade-Mark Cases concerned the constitutional validity of congres-
sional trademark legislation, not the constitutional scope of copy-
right protection.'65 Consequently, the Trade-Mark Cases Court's in-
terpretation of "writings," as used in the Copyright Clause, was
merely intended as a comparison to trademark law.' 66 The Trade-
Mark Cases Court did not interpret "writings" to demonstrate what
copyright law protected; rather, the purpose of the interpretation
was to show what trademark law did not protect. This language is
dictum because the Trade-Mark Cases Court was not required to
address the constitutional scope of copyright at all.
Thus, the Trade-Mark Cases context suggests that the Trade-Mark
Cases Court may not have intended to change the constitutional
scope of copyright protection. The Trade-Mark Cases Court did not
announce that it was rejecting a well-established and generally ac-
cepted copyright standard. Additionally, the Trade-Mark Cases Court
left open the possibility that directories may be copyrightable. The
Trade-Mark Cases Court used broad language, including "and the
like," when referring to the kind of works copyright protected.' 67
Because simple telephone directories were commonly protected
during the period of the Trade-Mark Cases the Court may not have
meant to exclude directories from its definition of protectable ma-
terial.
Similarly, Burrow-Giles may not support the Feist Court's asser-
tion that the creativity component of originality is constitutionally
mandated. The focus of Burrow-Giles was on determining the fram-
ers' intent regarding the scope of the words "authors" and "writ-
ings" as used in the Copyright Clause.' 68 Burrow-Giles, therefore,
focused on whether the framers intended to confine copyright pro-
tection to literary works. Indeed, shortly after Burrow-Giles was de-
cided, the United States Supreme Court cited it for the proposition
that "authors" and "writings," as used in the Copyright Clause, are
not confined to literary writers and their works.' 69 Additionally, as
with the Trade-Mark Cases, at the time of Burrow-Giles, case law and
secondary sources suggested that the constitutional framers in-
165 See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Trade-Mark Cases.
'Bo See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Trade-Mark Cases
Court's examination of the Copyright Clause.
i" 100 U.S. at 94.
'5° See supra notes 95-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bun-ow-Giles.
169 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 242 (1903).
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tended to protect the kind of informational work denied protection
in Feist. 17° Given this history, it is possible that in defining the word
"writings," as used in the Copyright Clause, the Burrow-Giles Court
did not intend to exclude directories from the scope of protection;
rather, the Court merely meant to expand the scope of protectable
works to include photographs and other non-literary writings.
B. Implications of the Feist Court's Assertion
The United States Supreme Court could have reached the
conclusion that the directory in Feist was not protected without
invoking the Constitution."' Indeed, the Court had several options.
First, the Feist Court could have held that Rural's white pages were
in fact copyrightable under the sweat of the brow theory because
compilation of the names and addresses in the directory required
effort."2 With such a holding the Supreme Court could have de-
termined that Feist did not borrow anything other than uncopy-
rightable facts. The Court therefore could have held that Feist's
borrowing did not rise to a level of actionable infringement." 3 Thus,
the Court could have reached the same result without rejecting the
sweat theory in its entirety.'"
Alternatively, the Court could have held that the white pages
were not copyrightable solely as a matter of statutory law." 3 Such a
'" See supra notes 32-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case law and
secondary sources supporting the protection of informational works.
171 See Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.: An Uncommon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 COPYRIGHT SOO( 83,
87 (1990).
175 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sweat of the brow
approach to copyright protection.
173 For an infringement analysis of the Feist case, see Perlmutter, supra note 7, at 12-18.
174 Instead, the Court explicitly and completely renounced the sweat theory. See Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., I 1 1 S. Ct. 1282,1291-94 (1991); Miller, supra note
2, at 515 (commenting that Feist signifies a "clear defeat" for the industrious collection
doctrine).
173 Because copyright protection is purely a creature of statute, the statutory definition
of copyrightable works must guide any analysis of the copyrightability of factual compilations.
Patry, supra note 6, at 48-49. Admittedly, the Court does conduct a statutory analysis. See
Feist, 111  S. Ct. at 1293-94. The Feist Court noted statutory support for its creative selection
and arrangement standard in 11 101 of the 1976 Act. Id. at 1293. Section 101, as quoted by
the Court, defines "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and assembly of pre-
existing data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." Id. at 1293 (quoting 17 U.S.C. 101
(1988)). According to the Court, § 101 therefore mandates, through its tripartite structure,
that a compilation seeking protection contemporaneously demonstrate three separate ele-
ments: "(1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the
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holding, which would not implicate the Constitution, would have
enabled Congress to amend the copyright statute to provide pro-
tection for factual compilations such as white pages listings.' 76
Under the Feist holding, however, an amendment to the 1976 Copy-
right Act protecting factual compilations would be unconstitu-
tional. 177
In light of these observations, the Feist decision raises several
important issues. The first issue concerns why the Court decided
Feist the way it did. The second involves whether the United States
Supreme Court usurped Congress's power in deciding Feist on both
constitutional and statutory grounds. The third concerns a deter-
mination of the scope of the Feist holding and an examination of
the possible implications on the future of factual compilations. Such
an examination is important in light of our national economy's
dependence on the production and dissemination of information. 178
It is unclear why the United States Supreme Court decided
Feist in the manner it did. Perhaps the Court was motivated by a
desire to ground its opinion in an even higher authority than itself—
the Constitution of the United States. Perhaps the Court was being
entirely sincere, albeit short-sighted and a little careless. Perhaps
the Feist Court's decision to deny protection to the white pages
listing of a telephone directory was really intended as a message to
Congress that to protect factual compilations, Congress must amend
the current copyright statute. In light of the Feist Court's insistence
upon the constitutional origin of the originality standard, however,
such an amendment would not be constitutional.
Regardless of why Feist was decided in the manner it was, that
Feist was decided on constitutional as well as statutory grounds raises
a second issue: whether the Supreme Court encroached upon Con-
gress's power in declaring the creativity prong of originality a con-
selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of
the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an 'original' work of authorship."
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1293. For a full discussion of why Rural's white pages are not copyrightable
strictly as a statutory matter, see Patry, supra note 6, at 57-61.
176
 Legislative history of the 1976 Act anticipates future Congresses' desire to protect
areas of existing subject matter that the 1976 Act does not protect. H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 30, at 52; S. REP. No. 473, supra note 30, at 51.
177 See Miller, supra note 2, at 534-35 (commenting that Feist's Constitutional grounding
of originality constitutes a "formidable roadblock" against future legislative efforts to provide
thicker protection to databases and factual compilations).
"B See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-11. See also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the importance or information in today's society.
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stitutional mandate. As previously noted, justice O'Connor engaged
in a pervasive constitutional analysis in the Feist decision. 179 This
constitutional analysis is unnecessary because the same outcome may
be reached from statutory analysis. 18° ConSequently, Feist creates
separation of powers tension.
According to one theory of constitutional interpretation, the
United States Supreme Court should allow legislatures and elected
executives, whenever possible, to police themselves. 18 ' This ap-
proach to judicial review, termed the "Bickellian approach" by
Guido Calabresi, notes that the Supreme Court should allow Con-
gress to pass or amend legislation to reach the result Congress
intends—particularly when no fundamental right is at stake.' 82 In-
deed, the right to retain copyright protection for a telephone di-
rectory may not implicate any fundamental constitutional right.'"
Thus, under the Bickellian approach to judicial review, the Feist
Court is justified in holding Rural's copyright invalid on statutory
grounds. The Feist Court, however, overstepped its judicial bound-
aries in implying that Congress cannot amend federal copyright
legislation to protect directories and other informational works. Of
course, such a conclusion assumes that the Feist Court actually in-
tended to limit Congress's ability to amend the federal copyright
statute. Future congressional attempts to modify the originality stan-
dard of copyright protection in the copyright statute may clarify
this issue.
Absent an amendment to the federal copyright statute, the
future of factual compilations is largely dependent upon the scope
of the Feist holding. Although the scope of Feist remains to be seen
as future courts interpret the decision, it is useful to consider some
of the possible interpretations. If read in isolation and related solely
to telephone directories, the Feist decision may have minimal im-
plications on the future of the production of factual compilations.
After all, the Feist decision is justifiable based on the policy that the
"I) See supra note 143-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's
constitutional analysis. Justice O'Connor engaged in constitutional analysis even though the
Court did not grant certiorari to address a constitutional issue. Hamilton, supra note 171, at
87.
18° See supra note 176 for a discussion of the outcome of Feist under statutory analysis.
191 See Guido Calabresi, Supreme Court 1990, Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Con-
stitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARI!. L. Ray. 80,103-06
(1991).
' 82 /d. at 106 & n.76.
'"3 Hamilton, supra note 171, at 90.
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goal of copyright is to promote knowledge and learning.' 84 In the
case of telephone directories, there probably is no need to worry
about generating incentives for production. For example, Rural was
required by law to publish the names, addresses and phone numbers
of its customers. In light of this pre-existing incentive, the additional
incentive of copyright protection may be unnecessary.' 85
On the other hand, if Feist is read to extend to other infor-
mational works, a concern for incentives may be warranted.' 85 Be-
cause a creator's potential to reap rewards increases with the amount
of protection a work receives, allowing the extensive use of facts
from directories other than white pages will necessarily reduce the
incentive for authors to create such directories. Consequently, the
American public may suffer from a decrease in the amount of
informational works produced after the Feist decision.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that there are public inter-
ests served by denying copyright protection to factual compilations.
The public may benefit from greater access to factual information
because it can be copied and reproduced freely. In turn, freer access
to information may motivate authors to create new works building
upon the unprotected information.' 87
It is also important to note that other types of informational
works may still be protected even after Feist. Feist does not com-
pletely rule out the possibility of copyright protection for factual
compilations. 188 Under Feist, a compilation will receive protection if
it is arranged in such a way as to meet the creativity prong of the
Court's test.' 89 The parameters of creativity, however, are not
clear.'" Thus, which compilations will be protected by copyright
law depends largely on future courts' interpretations of Feist."'
' 84 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the goals of copyright
law.
185 See Perlmutter, supra note 7, at 18.
I" See Yen, supra note 4, at 1374-75.
187
	 Perlmutter, supra note 7, at 20.
188
	 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv, Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1294 (1991).
189 Id. Indeed, the Feist Court admits that the creativity requirement is not stringent and
that the "vast majority" of compilations will meet the standard. Id. According to the Court,
copyright protection is unavailable only for a small category of works "in which the creative
spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent." Id.
' 9° Perhaps the Court will be very lenient with its creativity requirement. After all, the
alphabetical arrangement of names is historically one of the more trite methods of arranging
facts.
191 At the time of this writing, seven reported cases have interpreted Feist. Victor Lill
Enter., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991) (copyright protection






In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the United
States Supreme Court asserts that the dual-pronged originality stan-
dard is constitutionally mandated. 192 The Feist Court's rhetoric sug-
gests that such a requirement has always existed and that the Feist
decision naturally stems from an uncontroversial and well-estab-
lished constitutional principle. Upon closer examination, however,
it is evident that this is not the case. By selectively choosing prece-
dent, the Court overlooks the existence of a long tradition of law
interpreting originality to require only independent creation.
Consequently, the Feist Court asks the reader to believe that
society has no choice but to cope with a constitutionally mandated
dual-pronged originality requirement. In a society brimming over
with non-creative informational works, such a message is disheart-
ening. At the same time, the Court fails to fully account for its
reasoning. The danger in the Court's approach is clear: mandating
originality as a constitutional standard may preclude Congress from
protecting a growing body of informational works, which in turn
may discourage authors from producing them without copyright
protection. Even greater still is the danger resulting from a Court
that continues to build upon precedent without ever stopping to
ask why.
JENNIFER R. DOWD
containing winning numbers in illegal gambling operations); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937
F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991) (copyright claim valid and summary judgment inappropriate
for publisher of baseball pitching form because the possibility exists that, as a matter of law,
the selection and arrangement of nine items of information about pitchers' past performances
rises to minimum level of creativity under Feist); Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California,
937 F.2d 759, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (copyright protection available for pattern of roses
placed in straight lines, facing various directions, because sufficiently creative to warrant
protection under Feist originality standard); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851,
855 (6th Cir. 1991) (copyright protection unavailable for set of five double-sided signs where
entire set cannot stand as independent work apart from its components); Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Haines & Co., 932 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1991) (copyright protection unavailable for
telephone company's white pages); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Infor. Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 958 (11th Cir. 1991) (copyright protection available for
formatting of yellow pages into a convenient, unique organization of business listings and
advertisements); Project Dev. Group, Inc. v. O.H. Materials Corp., 766 F. Supp. 1348, 1354
(W.D. Pa. 1991) (copyright protection unavailable to components of bid proposal where no
originality in selection or arrangement of facts contained in subcontractor's estimates of scope
of work, price and quantities supplied to contractor).
192 111 S. Ct. at 1288. See also supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Court's assertion that the dual-pronged originality requirement is constitutionally
mandated.
